Introduction
Prior to the enactment of the Employment Contracts Act ("the Act'' or "the ECA"), there was much speculation concerning the impact the Act would have upon women. Since the passage of the Act in May 1991, a large literature has been amassed documenting its effect on won1en: little of it positive. The ECA, we are told, according to one extensive study, .. does not offer any advantage to women workers and . . . in fact, it has clearly disadvantaged women workers" (Hammond and Harbridge, 1993: 28) . The contribution ofth, e Act itself to women's worsened employment situation has been well debated, researched and recorded (Hill and du pJ, essis, 1993; Wilson, 1994) .
The purpose of this paper, however, is not to re-present these findings in an alternative form. Rather, this research investigates whether the employment institutions set up by the ECA do themselves contribute to thẽ gender bias experienced by women under the new employment law regimẽ.
It is important to recognise that gender bias can stem not only from the actions of individual decision-makers but can be present in the structure of institutions and their practices themselves. Thus gender bias can manifest itself in many ways: through awards of compensation; through sexist comments or treatment; by glossing over the different working experiences of men and women and failing to see how these might have had an impact on the case; and through the very processes of dispute resolution used by the employment institutions.
Methodology
Due to the difficulties of creation, compilation, and analysis inherent in a survey of those with experience in appearing before the Court and Tribunal (both as advocates/counsel and parties), in addition to the problems of obtaining a representative sample large enough to derive statistically significant conclusions, as well as overall time constraints, it was decided to forego this option in favour of a selective analysis of Tribunal and Court decisions over the period 1991 to 1994. Thus, the employment institutions were subject to an investigation of what they present for the record rather than presenting a mosaic of the impressions of those who have participated in the Court and Tribunal's dispute resolution processes.
It should be noted that as only reported decisions were considered for the quantitative analysis section, the following discussion will not be fully representative of Tribunal decisions, given the low rate of reporting for these decisions. The parameters of this paper were further narrowed by deciding to concentrate on personal grievance decisions and unjustified dismissal cases in particular. The later qualitative analysis, which focuses on decisions which may particularly affect women, considered both reported and unreported cases, and allows for discussion of gender bias in its wider institutional context.
The cases on which this paper is founded were taken from: firstly, a consideration of the Employment Reports of New Zealand (ERNZ) volumes from 1991 to 1994, backed up by a specific search for cases indexed under "discrimination -sexual"; "personal grievance" and "sexual harassment" for the same period; and secondly, reported and unreported cases . ,. inconsistent rate from year to year. Given the widely varying figures here, the only sensible conclusion to draw from this analysis is that gender does not appear to influence the result of the decision at this basic level.
Further analysis was then undertaken to see whether the decisions of men and women for example in a managerial capacity were likely to be overturned or upheld according to gender. .:
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• Where was specified in terms of time, the most common period mentioned was three months, for both sexes. The Labour Relations Act provided that reinstatement was to be the primary remedy where it was included in the remedies sought by a worker in a personal grievance. Note that those reinstated by interim injunction also tended to be white collar workas as well.
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Although the sample is small, it appears that women are awarded reinstatement less often than men are. This may be because women seek it less often than men do, maybe finding alternative employment more easily, or perhaps because they more often want to avoid a return to a place of unpleasant memories.
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Obviously, by the time a case has reached the point of adjudication, the relationship between the parties will not be the best. The employment institutions do not have the power to award remedies a personal grievant has not sought.
Section 40(1)(c): Compensation
There are two kinds of compensation awarded under s.40(l)(c). Compensation under s.40(1)(c)(i) is for "humiliation, loss of dignity and injury to the feelings of the employee", while s.40(1)(c)(ii) compensates for the "loss of any benefit, whether or not of a monetary kind, which the worker might reasonably have been expected to obtain if the personal grievance had not arisen." Unfortunately for the investigations of this report, decision-makers did not always specify whether the compensatory sum awarded was under s.40(1)(c)(i) or s.40(1)(c)(ii) or an aggregate of both. For tabular purposes, compensation was recorded simply as an award made under s.40(1)(c). However, since each subsection clearly has a different purpose, the amount awarded consequently reflects this. Comparisons of the awards made are therefore meaningless unless it is known whether the award was made to compensate for humiliation or loss of benefit. Thus in the analysis which follows the data presentation focuses only on those cases where the purpose of the compensation was indicated by the decision-maker. It should be noted that this tends to narrow the range of decisions available for analysis somewhat.
Again, the compensation awarded under this section appears to follow no pattern that can be tied to gender. While in 1991 and 1992 men's and women's average awards were very similar, and the midpoint awarded the same, this changed in 1993 where the average award made to men was five times that for women, and the median amount of compensation for men was three times higher than the women's median. However, this state of affairs was reversed the following year when the men's average was two-fifths of the women's average, and the women's median almost twice that of men.
Compensation for loss of benefit appears to be linked to income and other non-discretionary factors. Therefore, it was decided to focus on compensation levels for humiliation, loss of dignity and injury to feelings, as it is here that the possibility of gender bias seems more likely as there is no statutory forrnula for deciding the level of award.
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There appears to be no research on this point. However, an overview of the employment institutions database reveals that for the period 1991 -1995 women seeking reinstatement were almost as equally likely to be successful as not (data on file with author). There was one case recording the abandonment of reinstatement as a remedy by woman: TerHaar v Eliot-Cotton Associates [1993) 1 ERNZ 371. There was also one case of a man refusing an employer's offer of reinstatement: Finau v Carter Holt Building Supplies [1993] 2 ERNZ 971.
By this system, the award of compensation becomes removed from consequences it was supposed to be compensating for. Income may not be relevant at all to the way someone may react when unjustifiably dismissed or sexually harassed.
There are also no guarantees that a person occupying a managerial position will need more compensation for injury to feelings than may someone who works on the factory floor. There is the unstated inference that those who earn less have feelings that are easily assuaged, and so less is required to soothe them. Again, as women are clustered into a small range of lowpaying occupations, this devalues the work-related hurt of women arising from a personal • grtevance.
It is suggested that awards of compensation under s.40(1)(c)(i) should focus more closely on the actual circumstances that gave rise to the personal grievance. Greater emphasis should be placed on the actual reactions and feelings of the personal grievant, rather than lining up compensation with the person's income. A more individualised and contextual assessment of the hurt the individual has suffered would go some way towards negating the gender bias ingrained in this system. Although the employment institutions claim to uphold this approach, it seems that it is not necessarily always practised.
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Another area for concern arises when the amounts awarded to women for injury to feelings are read in conjunction with the comments of decision makers regarding the level of emotional harm suffered as a result of the personal grievance. Even allowing for differences amongst decision makers, the overall impression is that women's harm is compensated at a lower level than men's, even when the effects of the matters leading to a personal grievance have been similar or more serious.
For example, in 1991, a woman described as being "severely traumatised" and having undergone a "great deal of distress" after an unjustified dismissal was awarded $5,000 compensation under s.40(1)(c)(i), 18 while in the same year a man also unjustifiably dismissed was awarded $3,000, even though the Tribunal member commented "there was surprisingly little evidence about the humiliation, loss of dignity and injury to Mr Roderique' s feelings. "
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The award was justified on the basis that all dismissals are "naturally humiliating" and that his employer had made a hurtful comment about Mr Roderique, mitigated by the long time allowed before Mr Roderique actually had to leave the company.
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Comments of this nature make one wonder what amount would have been awarded as a token gesture to a woman who had suffered only minimal hurt.
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See PA 0 'Connor v Brass [1994] It is tempting to ascribe this state of affairs to the employment institutions coming to terms with the new regime set up by the ECA. However, this does not seem to provide an adequate explanation. In 1992, another unjustified dismissal case saw $7,000 compensation awarded under s.40(1)(c)(i), where again the male grievant had again "adduced little evidence ... on the extent of the humiliation, loss of dignity and injury to feelings. " 21 A woman in similar circumstances, providing "non-existent or meagre" evidence of the injury to her feelings (although the Tribunal acknowledged that she had suffered "some distress" and had had "quite a shock"), was awarded only $4,000.
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This pattern of the differing valuations of the hurt suffered by men and women continued in 1992. In two cases where the parties were both awarded $8,000 compensation for humiliation and loss of dignity, Mr Baussmann' s evidence stated that he "felt uncomfortable", he had not been treated with "proper courtesy", while the Tribunal did not elaborate on its reasons for making the award other than stating that it accepted the evidence of his wife, 23 while Mrs
Harding, who was dismissed by hẽr ex-husband, found the whole ẽpisode "deeply distressing. " 24 The complainants appear to have had distinctly different experiences, yet this is not reflected in their awards.
This trend exhibits itself consistently over the four years under investigation. The employment institutions claim to uphold the "eggshell skull" rule, commenting in 1994:
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That means that different sums of compensation might be awarded to two different grievants unjustifiably dismissed on exactly the same facts. The two grievants may be constructed with two differẽnt personalities. One personality may be more sensitive to the effects of the dismissal . . . The question is not the degree of cause, but the degree of [effect] on the feelings of the uniquely constituted personality of the en1ployee .
Having said this, the Tribunal went on to award the "extrẽmely disturbed" Ms Brass in that case $3,500 for what it described as a "major injury to her feelings". On appeal, the award was upheld, and the presiding judge concluded that she was "quite shattered emotionally by her experience" describing it as "v, ery frightening" (her mentally disturbed employer's actions had resulted in her constructive dismissal). Two months later, a motor mechanic was awarded $3,750 as compensation for his hurt feelings in an unjustified dismissal case, with no discussion of the effect on the employee.
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It is difficult to see what could account for these very similar awards in strikingly different circumstances, given the supposed commitment to taking into account the actual effect on the employee.
In 1994 the Tribunal awarded $30,000 compensation to a gay man who was accidentally "outed" (i.e. his homosexuality was disclosed without his consent) at work to compensate for the homophobic sexual harassment he was subject to (including threats to do him bodily harm), leading to continuing insecurity at work and eventually resulting in his transfer to Australia.
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While this decision is laudable from the point of view of taking sexual harassment seriously, it is cause for concern that the amount awarded in 1995 to Gaye Davidson in the Christchurch Civic Creche case was also $30,000.
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Ms Davidson was subject to police investigation and stood trial for child abuse allegations, received a bullet in the mail with her name engraved on it and has had to give up her chosen career and retrain in her late forties.
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While both cases are undeniably serious, it is questionable that the disruption of Mr L' s career and the disruption of Ms Davidson's life were deserving of the same amount of compensation.
Discretionary compensation awards allow institutions to (amongst other things) decide how much people are worth. It seems clear that there is a distinct pattern in the employment institutions of valuing the hurt experienced by women as being worth less than the hurt experienced by men. Women seem to have to experience deeper levels of injury to their feelings than men do, in order to receive the same level of compensation and are compensated less when they experience similar effects from a personal grievance as men do. Even if it could be explained by saying that the employment institutions expect women to be more emotional than men and so rank their outward show of emotion with the lesser, more contained reactions of men as actually being of equal effect, this relies on sexist stereotypes in making decisions, abstracts the individuals from their experiences, devalues and trivialises the harm suffered by women and uses a male standard as a yardstick for compensation. This is gender bias.
The majority of this analysis centred on awards for unjustified and constructive dismissal, these being the most common causes of claims for compensation under s.40{l)(c)(i). However, dismissals are not the only area where this undervaluing of women occurs. Davis Van Leeuwen v Skedden [1994] 
.
40(1)(11):
· section has little-used in both the reported and tmrcpoi ted caaea by the institiJtions. Over the years 1991 -1994 It also should be noted that neither of the two cases which considered s.40(1)(d) employed it to make recommendations concerning a specific harasser (or group of harassers). Although in both cases the personal grievants had left their workplaces, this should not be seen as a solution to the problem. While efforts to stamp out workplace culture which condones and/or encourages sexual harassment are to be encouraged, recommendations concerning the behaviour of certain persons should also be considered more frequently.
Selective qualitative analysis of Court and Tribt•nal decisions
This section focuses on the employment institutions' treatment of issues which are of particular relevance to women: discrimination and sexual harassment.
Discrimi1Uition
Discrimination on the basis of sex is a ground for a personal grievance under s.28 of the Act. Decisions considering this section are few. The very small number of cases here makes comment concerning any trends of gender bias or otherwise difficult. Nonetheless, they are mentioned here for the sake of completeness. (Davis, 1994: 29) .
• HOII8e "Northland Area Health Board [1991) It would appear that most sexual harassment cases that come before the employment institutions are settled by mediation. However, all sexual harassment cases considered under the ECA provisions still form only a small part of the total of cases settled each year (even when taking into account the fact that many cases investigated by the HRC are not employment-related) (Swarbrick: 1995: 28) . The reluctance of women to bring sexual harassment cases before the employment institutions is cause for concern. This concern may be explained somewhat by considering the fact that for women sexually harassed in their employment, the ECA sections are rather restrictive: liability is only imposed against the employer even where the harassment is carried out by co-workers or clients, 40 and, in the case of sexual harassment by those other than the employer, liability occurs only when the employer has not taken whatever steps are practicable to prevent a repeat of the sexual harassment by that person. 41 Thus, in many cases, women may simply not be eligible to use the ECA provisions, whereas the HRC procedures are wider in their scope. Although no blame can be laid at the door of the employment institutions for the narrow application of the ECA in sexual harassment matters, the narrowness of the sections themselves remains a concern, especially as they give the impression that sexual harassment in the workplace is not properly the sphere of employment legislation. Further, HRC procedures come at no cost, while for those without the benefit of union representation, the thought of paying for legal advice may act as a deterrent to taking a case.
While the employment institutions themselves cannot be considered to have contributed to these reasons why women might prefer to take their cases to the HRC, they are not immune from critique of their dealings with the cases that do actually come before them. Davis (1994: 31) concluded that there was considerable evidence of gender bias in this area of the law, including:
analysis of concepts from a male perspective; failure to appreciate and act upon the real life experience of women; of the effects of decisions on women; reliance on myths about sexual harass1nent; and failure to recognise unstated assumptions or to scrutinise tmtested asswnptions . . . Some decision makers appear neither to understand nor, in some cases, even to accept the basic prenlise on which the legislation is founded: that sexual harasstnent is 1mlawful and can seriously ha•nt women ... This documented lack of sympathy on the part of the employment institutions would appear to underscore the decision of many women to prefer the HRC over the employment institutions' procedures. However, in the few years since that comment was made, there appears to have been a significant improvement in the employment institutions' treatment of the sexual harassment cases that have come before them. Although the number of cases remains small, the seriousness with which sexual harassment is now taken by the employment institutions has increased considerably. All acts of alleged sexual harassment were to be treated with the same degree of seriousness for the purposes of proof.
Previously, it had been understood that complaints to an employer of sexual harassment had to be in writing before the employer was obliged to take action. Such a requirement may be a disincentive for women to make, or pursue, a complaint. However, in the 1994 case of X v AB Co Ltd, 48 the Tribunal dispelled this misconception over the use of the word "may" in s.36(1)(b), stating "justice should not be a slave to grammar ... the words [are not] mandatory, they are used in an empowering sense." 49 Mediation: advantages and disadvantages for women Mediation of employment disputes plays a large part in the activities of the Employment Trib1Jnal. In fact, nation-wide, approximately 60 percent of all cases before the Tribunal are mediated, with 85 percent of these being settled, (Gardiner, 1993: 3) although regional differences mean that the total of mediated settlements is considerably higher in some centres. One significant aspect of mediated settlements is that they are confidential. This means that a considerable proportion of all cases that are brought before the employment institutions are una:vailable for research scrutiny. Given the small numbers of women appearing in the cases that are available, it would seem that a greater proportion of women than men have their cases resolved at the mediation stage. As mediated settlements appear to fotnt a significant part of women's experiences with the Employment Tribunal, but cannot be analysed for reasons of confidentiality, what follows is a theoretical analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of mediation as a form of dispute resolution for women. However, this section comes with a caveat: it should not be taken as an evaluation of actual-Tribunal practice, although naturally what is said here will be of relevance to the issue of gender bias in the employment institutions.
The typical mediation involves a dismissed employee and his or her employer. Over 80 percent of mediations are personal grievances, and of those, 95 percent relate to alleged unjustifiable dismissals (Gardiner, 1993: 4) . Eighty-five percent of women are employees, compared to seventy-three percent of men, while eleven percent of men are employers as compared to five and a half percent of women (Ryan, 1993) . Thus, in the typical mediation, a dismissed female employee is twice as likely to be facing a male employer than a female one. Whether the typical personal grievance mediation is also more likely to see a female employee than a male one is unclear, given the lack of data relating to the gender of the personal grievants.
At 475. [1994] (especially where the employment relationship may be continuing) than their rights. Recent critiques of rights-talk have commented on the way in which isolated discussion of rights can lead to a sense of alienation from the justice system (although see Williams, 1987) . Moreover, there has also been much research in the past fifteen years, suggesting that women define themselves in terms of their relationships to others (Gilligan, 1982) . If this is so, as a process which operates with a stronger emphasis on the parties' relationship and discourages reliance on caselaw and legal principles, mediation is a method of resolving differences which fits more with women's sense of themselves than adjudication. In that mediation also puts the facts at the centre of the dispute, as opposed to the law, this lessens the chance of gender bias as the reality of women's working lives are uncovered and acknowledged, something which does not always happen when it is the law that is the prime concern.
However, mediation cannot be seen as a cure-all form of dispute resolution for women. Concerns have been raised about the inability of mediation to redress the power imbalance of the parties who come to mediation. Power is situational in the employment relation, and as already noted, women are almost sixteen times more likely to be an employee before the Tribunal than an employer. Power is also intertwined with gender, (MacKinnon, 1987) and women employees are twice as likely to be facing a male employer than a female one. When these two combine, the possibility arises that women will be more compromising than men to their detriment. If the mediator maintains a position of strict neutrality, and does nothing to redress the power imbalance, the disadvantage women experience in adjudication, then mediation fails as a means of empowering women and perpetuates inequality instead.
The flip side of concerns about neutrality is the issue of mediator bias. Generally, the fact that mediations are private is seen as a benefit for both parties, enabling them to make concessions and discuss matters they would not bring up in a public arena. However, the private and informal nature of mediation does allow the mediator to shape the procedure, and possibly the result: for example, a mediator may take an active role, advising the parties on their options and suggesting possible solutions, or he or she may simply chair discussions between them. Mediators have the opportunity to advance certain values by their actions which may harm women or exhibit sexist behaviour by their treatment of the parties which is never exposed to public light.
Overall, mediation has many advantages which adjudication cannot match. However, women going into mediation do not wholly escape the "male" nature of adjudication, for mediation comes with its own dangers which should not be ignored.
Conclusion
The overt and widespread gender bias documented by the task forces in North America and Australia has not been paralleled by this investigation into New Zealand's employment institutions. The statistical analysis reveals little in the way of the sex of the parties influencing the decision. These non-patterned results indicate that findings of fact and law are made free from considerations of the sex of the parties before the employment institutions. 
